Comments on Capital Punishment and Clemency by DiSalle, Michael V.
COMMENTS ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND
CLEMENCY
MICHAEL V. DISALLE*
It is doubtful that the death sentence would produce much
controversy if it were not for the power of clemency granted to the
governors of most states and to the president in the United States,
and in most civilized nations, to the ruling head. It has produced
not only a great amount of criticism from lay people, but a sub-
stantial amount from members of the bar who do not favor
clemency. Some members of the bar, who usually favor clemency
for their clients, feel that it is an unnecessary invasion of the re-
sponsibilities of the judiciary when they are not involved.
It is almost axiomatic that if a man has been sentenced to
death his execution produces very little in the way of post mortem
controversy. Newspapers may carry a paragraph stating that:
"John Doe paid his debt to society by being electrocuted in the
Ohio State Penitentiary last evening." But should a condemned
killer be successful in his plea for clemency, it then becomes news,
and controversy rages on the front pages of many newspapers as
well as in a flood of letters directed to the governor's office object-
ing to this abuse of his executive power.
Early in 1960, while considering an application for clemency
on behalf of an individual sentenced to death, I received a letter
from a member of the bar which said:
I would suggest that the law giving the governor the right to
prevent execution of those convicted under the laws of Ohio gives
one man a power which is not proper and should be eliminated.
This power has been misused in the past by "lame duck" gov-
ernors for political purposes. The courts and not the governor
have reviewed the evidence and certainly are the more qualified to
rule on the question of clemency.
If we were to repeal those sections of the Constitution and
those statutes which have been misused, I would venture to say
that some of our greatest guarantees of freedom would be elim-
inated. I believe that the taking of a man's life is wrong. The
state cannot properly contend that since killing is wrong it has the
right to kill.
The classical argument against capital punishment is that it
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is not a deterrent; that it is a demeaning exercise of power by
civilization. I want to emphasize that from my own personal
experience those who were sentenced to death and appeared before
me for clemency were mostly people who were without funds for a
full and adequate defense, friendless, uneducated, and with men-
talities that bordered on being defective.
Although I had personal convictions against the death penalty,
I felt that since it was a part of the law of the State of Ohio I
had to enforce it unless there were mitigating circumstances present.
Consequently, in this article I would rather discuss the need for
the clemency power for it was in the exercise of clemency that we
found the most misunderstanding and the greatest controversy.
On Monday, April 18, 1960, in connection with granting a
reprieve to Frank Poindexter I stated:
We now find ourselves in the rather incongruous position where
the ringleader, the instigator, the brains of the crime has been
sentenced to life imprisonment and the dupe, the camp-follower,
has been sentenced to death.
Two philosophical questions haunt me at this time. Is it just
that two men, one who pleaded guilty and one who was found
guilty under the same set of facts should be treated differently?
Is it in the best interests of justice and our democratic society that
a man who avails himself of the constitutional right to a trial
should receive a greater degree of punishment than the one who
pleaded guilty to the same crime?
These two questions then again cause me a problem of deciding
whether or not the constitutional authority of granting clemency
should be used to correct what, in my opinion, is an imbalance in
justice.
It is certain that the right to grant clemency is not limited by
law. Cummings and McFarland make a distinction between the
due and impartial course of the law and the administration of
justice.' In 1799, President John Adams had made the same dis-
tinction when he said that he did not feel that the two were the
same since other factors do intervene which would not necessarily
make justice synonymous with the law.
In support of the Pardon Provision of the then new Constitu-
tion, Alexander Hamilton said in the Federalist:
Humanity and good policy conspired to dictate, that the benign
prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered
or embarassed. The criminal code of every country partakes so
much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to excep-
tions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a coun-
tenance too sanguinary and cruel.2
1 Cummings & McFarland, Federal Justice 48 (1937).
2 The Federalist No. 74, at 341 (Hallowell ed. 1842).
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In Ex parte Grossman,3 Chief Justice William Howard Taft
made the following statement:
Executive clemency exists to afford relief from undue harshness
or evident mistake in the operation or enforcement of the criminal
law. The administration of justice by the courts is not necessarily
always wise or certainly considerate of circumstances which may
properly mitigate guilt. To afford remedy, it has always been
thought essential in popular governments, as well as in monarchies,
to vest in some other authority than the courts power to amelio-
rate or avoid particular criminal judgments. It is a check en-
trusted to the Executive for special cases. To exercise it to the
extent to destroying the deterrent effect of judicial punishment
would be to pervert it; but whoever is to make it useful must
have full discretion to exercise it. Our Constitution confers this
discretion on the highest officer in the nation in confidence that he
will not abuse it.4
The pardoning authority has been referred to as a criminal
court of equity. In proper cases individuals may seek relief from
criminal judgments at law based on equitable considerations not
available in courts of law.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in the well-known case of
Biddle v. Perovich made the following observation:
We will not go into history, but we will say a word about the
principles of pardon in the law of the United States. A pardon
in our days is not a private act of grace from an individual hap-
pening to possess power. It is a part of the constitutional scheme.
When granted, it is the determination of the ultimate authority
that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less than
what the judgment fixed.5
In 1939, the Attorney General gave considerable attention to
a study of pardon, parole, and clemency. In his conclusions the
following statement appears:
Emerging from the field of mere arbitrary caprice or semi-magical
folklore, pardon has become an institution which is part of, and
yet above, the legal system. It has never been crystalized into
rigid rules. Rather, its function has been to break rules. It has
been the safety valve by which harsh, unjust, or unpopular results
of formal rules could be corrected. The almost wholly unrestricted
scope of the power has been both its greatest weakness and its
greatest strength. In the hands of arbitrary rulers exercising the
power merely to indulge their personal whims, it has been subject
to the most flagrant abuses. On the other hand, it has been the
tool by which many of the most important reforms in the substan-
tive criminal law have been introduced. Ancient law was much
3 267 U. S. 87 (1924).
4 Id. at 120.
274 U.S. 480, 486 (1926).
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more static and rigid than our own. As human judgment came
to feel that a given legal rule, subjecting a person to punishment
under certain circumstances, was unjust, almost the only available
way to avoid the rule was by pardon.8
It appears that the need for the authority is clear. However,
the method in which the authority is to be exercised is far
from clear.
What are the precise grounds on which clemency should pro-
ceed? "It is easier to ask than to answer this question," said
Governor Hill of New York.7 The philosopher, Montesquieu.
thought this "a point more easily felt than prescribed." 8
A study of executive clemency in Wisconsin, conducted by
J. L. Gillin, Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of
Wisconsin, indicated that there was no established pattern by the
various governors in the extension of clemency. However, of the
209 recommendations for commutation of sentence made by the
Pardon Board in 1935 and 1937, 21% were made in order that
the sentence in that particular case might be equalized with others
committed for like crimes.'
In the case of Ex parte Wells, the Court stated:
Without such a power of clemency to be exercised by some depart-
ment or functionary of the government, it would be most imperfect
and deficient in its political morality.10
The power to pardon is but the counterpart of the power to
condemn. Justice, itself, demands that some means of correcting
the errors of the law should be devised. In some rare cases, justice
would demand mercy where the law condemns. However, there is
at least one provision of constitutional limitation upon the power
which is practically universal. This is a provision which requires
that reasons for the pardon be given. Of course, this does not
mean that the reason must be adequate, but it does mean that a
reason, however trivial, must be assigned. Often the reasons for
pardons have been absurd and ridiculous. An article in the Ken-
tucky Law Journal tells of one governor remitting a death sentence
because "hanging would do the man no good." Another pardoned
a man guilty of larceny because "the defendant was about to be
married." "
6 U.S. Dept. of Justice, 3 Attorney General's Survey of Release Procedures 295
(1918).
7 154 N. Am. Rev. 56 (1892), cited in Barnett, "The Grounds of Pardon," 6 Ore.
L. Rev. 205, 206 (1927).
8 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Law, bk. 6, ch. 21.
9 Relevant excerpts from this study may be found in Gillin, Criminology &
Penology 591 (3 ed. 1945).
10 Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 310 (1855).
11 Stoke, "A Review of the Pardoning Power," 16 Ken. L. 3. 34, 36 (1927).
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To further point up the lack of pattern and procedures in the
consideration of applications for clemency, Governor George Hoad-
ley, of Ohio, more than seventy years ago told of the pressures
brought to bear on him for pardons.
As the work is now done, the pardoning business is carried on
mainly by ear-wigging. At the Governor's Office, at his residence,
on the streets, in the cars, at the theatre, in church, everywhere
the work of solicitation proceeds.12
It was no doubt for this reason that the Ohio Weekly Law
Bulletin, in 1913, carried a note entitled, "Pardoning Power."
Certain it is that the pardoning power is thus shown to be a
dangerous weapon which might at some future time be used in a
manner detrimental to the best interests of the state. This power
has probably been more freely exercised in the past few years than
ever before. In fact, pardons were handed out in bunches over
last Christmas day by the governors of several states, in many
instances to life termers. We predict that in the near future the
exercise of this power will be hedged about with limitations. And
why should it not be? Upon the trial of a criminal case it is
recognized that the State has rights to preserve, and when thejury has rendered a verdict in the preservation of those rights,
why should another branch to the government have the power
by a single stroke of a pen to set it at naught, for no reasons at
all, or for reasons having nothing to do with the justice of the
case.
13
However, the need is well demonstrated by an article on pardon
as an extraordinary remedy, written by Henry Weihofen of the
University of Colorado:
First of all, in answer to the argument of Beccaria that clemency
should be shown through the laws, not through the executive, it
is pointed out that a perfect system of legislation, which does exactjustice in each case, is unattainable.
The practical situations which will arise, and to which the law
must be applied, are so complex and indefinite in their variety
that no human legislator can foresee all of the combinations of
facts which future cases will involve, and draft a set of rules
which will operate to accomplish the general end desired in all
cases. In short, under the most carefully drafted legislative enact-
ment there occasionally will be 'hard cases' in which the letter of
the law was not intended to operate, and would violate the com-
munity sense of justice.14
12 Hoadley, The Pardoning Power 12 (1886) cited in U.S. Dept. of Justice,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 156.
13 58 Weekly Law Bulletin 65 (1913).
14 Weihofen, "Pardon as an Extraordinary Remedy," 12 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 112,
113 (1940).
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The same article continued:
Historically, pardon has always been the broadest and least lim-
ited of powers. By its very nature, it could not be subjected to
rules or restrictions. Its function was rather to break rules,
wherever in the opinion of the pardoning authority mercy, clem-
ency, justice or merely personal whim dictated. But this very
unlimited scope of the power itself implied one limitation: it was
intended as an ultimate, extraordinary remedy, designed to be
used in cases where the ordinary legal remedies were not available.
It was never intended to be used as a regular, ordinary release
procedure. From time to time, pardons came to be granted as a
matter of course for certain reasons, but when that became true,
such reasons were soon made legally defenses, justifying a verdict
of not guilty, and pardon became unnecessary.' 5
The possibility that the pardoning power might be abused is
minimal as demonstrated by the careful approach by governors to
the exercise of the authority.
Professor James D. Barnett, of the University of Oregon, indi-
cated a substantial guarantee in the exercise of the authority in
the following language:
The spotlight of publicity is focused upon some parts of the gov-
ernment, illuminating those offices so brightly that the incumbent's
every move is observable, but the brightness of the light thrown
around the Governor's chair, for example, leaves the other offices
in even darker obscurity. Hence, those acts not directly asso-
ciated with the central and dramatic figure of the Governor are
likely to be overlooked entirely by a public none too well educated
in dealing with its officials.
This statement was made with the explanation that for every
two or three criminals that we succeed in capturing, another is
released. I would use it to illustrate that, although the power of
clemency seems to be absolute by Constitution, the light thrown
around the governor's chair is, in itself, a guarantee that the power
and authority has not and would not be abused.
Professor Barnett goes on to say:
One pardon granted by the Chief Executive of the State Capitol
will attract more attention than a dozen releases made by an
obscure and unknown board working in the shadows of the
prison.
Al Smith once said:
Most men grow in public office. If the exact effects of all the
influences on a governor could be measured, it would be found
that the power of reprieve, commutation and pardon adds, as the
Bible says, the most cubits to his stature.
15 Id. at 114.
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Governor Harriman, in an article appearing in the Saturday
Evening Post, described it as follows:
In some utopian age every punishment will fit every crime per-
fectly. Until then, the power of clemency will be needed to set
aside the extreme penalty where the law is inflexible and to weigh
factors that the judge and jury could not take into consideration.
What are the situations in which clemency may properly be
used? Sometimes it is necessary to pursue justice through the
combined effort of law and pardon. Sometimes technicalities of law
produce a result which does not correspond to the feeling of justice
of the people. For example, a principal in the second degree shares
the legal fate of the real perpetrator. An aider and abettor is liable
for such crimes committed by the principal in the first degree as
were done in execution of their common purpose.
The 1939 Attorney General's Survey of Release Procedures
made the following conclusions, inter alia, as to instances in which
clemency might very well be exercised:
Technical violations leading to hard results. We have mentioned
at least one example-where the legal "principal" in a crime may
be only a comparatively innocent hireling, while the brains of the
plot is legally guilty only as an accessory. 16
Applications for reprieve or commutation especially in death sen-
tence cases. Here, too, liberalization of judicial procedure should
permit reprieves to be granted by the courts. But while there is
somewhat less logical reason for retaining this power in the
executive than can be found [in other examples], this last
recourse to the Governor in these cases is a benevolent power,
which we shall probably want to retain and it will no doubt
continue to be a major part of the pardoning power.17
Governor Chamberlain, of Oregon, discussed clemency in
these words:
The administration of justice is uneven. To illustrate: There are
ten judicial districts in the state. A man may be convicted in
one of a simple felony, and sentenced to a long term in the peni-
tentiary; while in another, where the crime committed is the same
and under almost identical circumstances, the prisoner may be
given a very short term. It seems to me that it is a part of the
duty of the executive branch of the government to equalize, where
conditions warrant, this apparent inequality in the administration
of justice.' 8
16 U.S. Dept. of Justice, op. cit. supra note 6, at 299.
17 Ibid.
18 Message of Governor G. E. Chamberlain, of Oregon, to the Twenty-fifth
Legislative Assembly (1909) quoted in Barnett, op. cit. supra note 7, at 219.
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In Ohio the governor's power of commutation is found in
Section II, Article III of the Constitution. Here, too, the governors
have frequently used the power of clemency to make the penalty
imposed on the individual offender consistent with the penalty
imposed upon other individual offenders.
For example, in the case of Rudy Ashbrook and William Tibbs
in 1934 arising from a shooting in Cincinnati, each named the other
as the triggerman. Ashbrook was tried shortly after his arrest;
the jury found him guilty of murder in the first degree without
mercy. A month later, Tibbs was tried. The jury found him guilty
of murder in the first degree, but recommended mercy.
In April 1935, Governor Davey commuted the death sentence
of Ashbrook, apparently because of (a) doubt as to whether Ash-
brook was the triggerman, (b) the trial of Ashbrook was so soon
after the crime was committed, (c) petition for mercy by eleven
of the jurors, and (d) recommendation of the Parole Commission
that sentence should be commuted.
Charles L. Ames and Julius Emrick in 1947 killed a Dayton
police officer while in the process of attempting a burglary. Emrick,
the triggerman, was tried. The jury found him guilty of murder in
the first degree and recommended mercy. Thereafter Ames was
convicted of murder in the first degree by a jury which failed to
recommend mercy. In commuting the death sentence of Ames,
Governor Thomas Herbert said:
• . . in America, we pride ourselves on doing comparative jus-
tice... in view of the fact that the first jury recommended mercy
with its verdict of first degree murder, thereby compelling a sen-
tence of life imprisonment by the court, I am impelled to . . .
commute the sentence of Ames to the same penalty... I am com-
muting Ames' sentence not from any sympathy for Ames, but in
order that it may not be said that Ohio failed in comparative
justice ....
A third instance: Cleo Eugene Peters and Michael G. Du-
moulin, while engaged in robbing a Holmes County farmer and
molesting his wife, killed the husband. Peters was the triggerman,
but Dumoulin was very aggressive. Peters was tried and convicted
of murder in the first degree without mercy by a jury. Thereafter
Dumoulin was tried to a three-judge court which found him guilty
of murder in the first degree with a recommendation of mercy.
There was a belief in the community that Dumoulin was more or
less the leader. Governor C. Wm. O'Neill, in commuting the death
sentence indicated that, in part at least, comparative justice was
the basis for his action when he noted that: "Under the law they
were equally guilty."
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One of the most publicized of all was the case of the gang led
by Thomas Licavoli. Late in 1933 Sarafino Sinatra, alias Joe
"Wop" English, was tried for the murder of one of the victims.
The jury found him guilty of murder in the first degree without a
recommendation of mercy. In the following term of court Thomas
Licavoli, Sinatra, Jacob "Firetop" Sulkin, and ten others were
jointly indicted on four counts of murder.
In November 1934, Thomas Licavoli, who apparently was not
physically present at the scene of the homicides, was tried first.
The jury found him guilty of murder in the first degree and recom-
mended mercy. Sulkin was next tried and found guilty of first
degree murder without a recommendation of mercy.
On January 10, 1935, Governor George White commuted the
death sentence of English. On March 7, 1936, Governor Davey
commuted the death sentence of Sulkin, because of the fact that
Licavoli, who was undoubtedly the leader of the gang, received
mercy at the hands of the jury. It is assumed that Governor White
acted in the English case essentially on the same basis.
In many homicide cases involving more than one person, the
fact that one was the triggerman is deemed sufficient to justify
the imposition of a stronger sentence. But the law is clear that
they are both equally guilty of the same offense if they are
guilty at all.
In the case of State v. Phillips, the court, in its opinion, laid
down this principle of law:
... it is not material which of them be charged as principal in the
first degree as having given the mortal blow; for the mortal injury
given by any of those present is in contemplation of law the
injury of each and every one of them.19
This seems to have been the feeling of Ohio governors in the
above described commutations.
The difficulty of these cases is illustrated in two matters of
clemency which faced Governor Frank Lausche. In the famous
case involving Max Amerman, who coveted another man's wife
and who influenced his young friend, Jerry Killinger, to kill the
husband, Governor Lausche granted clemency to Killinger although
Amerman was executed. Evidently Governor Lausche took into
consideration the discrepancy in age between the two men and the
fact that Amerman was the brains and the instigator, whereas
Killinger was a hero-worshiping weakling.
Again, Governor Lausche was faced with a case in Licking
County where two AWOL Marines killed an innocent driver while
hitch-hiking. In spite of a unanimous recommendation by the
19 State v. Phillips & Ross, 24 Mo. App. 475, 481 (1857).
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Pardon and Parole Commission, the Governor did not stay the exe-
cution of Louis Angel, the triggerman, even though his accomplice,
Harmon Cordray, escaped scot-free as a result of a jury verdict of
acquittal. Cordray had no previous record; Angel had a juvenile
record. The Pardon and Parole Commission felt that the question
of comparative justice was raised by the acquittal of the accom-
plice. Many people urged clemency for Angel, but only the Gov-
ernor knew the strain and the thought that went into making what
has been referred to as the "awesome decision" in each case-one
where he granted clemency, one where he denied it.
Custom and tradition, as well as justice, demand that the
governor's particular concern in reviewing an application for clem-
ency must be in making certain that ultimate justice is achieved.
In the words of Lord Bacon, "In cases of life and death, judges
ought to (as far as the law permitteth) in justice remember mercy
and to cast a severe eye upon the example, but a merciful eye upon
the person."
We in Ohio require the unanimous agreement of twelve jurors
in a death case. We feel that a death case should not be submitted
to a single judge without a jury but that there should be three
judges sitting on such an important matter. We are so concerned
-with reference to the delicacy of taking a man's life that in the
case of the electrocution itself there are two switches and two guards
acting simultaneously in order that neither will know who actually
pulled the death lever.
The governor's role, however, is one in which there can be no
transfer of responsibility. When he reviews an application for clem-
ency he knows that this is the individual's last resort. This cannot
be done in the secrecy of a jury room. He cannot salve his con-
science by saying, "Maybe my switch did not cause the man to die."
If we take a man's freedom in error we might compensate for
that mistake. If we take a man's life the damage is irreparable.
Clemency is an essential part of our system of justice. It is for this
reason alone, if for no other, that there be a more general recognition
of its need, its purpose, and the difficulties incumbent with its
administration.
It is because of the solitude in which he must make his decision
that the governor's method of arriving at the result is not hampered
by rules of evidence. He is free -to secure information in whatever
manner he feels will best serve the cause of ultimate justice.
Whereas, testimony secured through the use of a polygraph is not
admissible in a court of law, there is no restriction against a gov-
ernor giving or refusing to give weight to such testimony in arriving
at his decision.
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This is also true with the use of sodium amytal. In fact, the
Toledo Times in commenting on the fact that the governor was not
restricted said that "if he saw fit he could use the reading of tea
leaves in arriving at his decision." If the rules of evidence were to
be as restrictive as is the case in the actual trial, it would be almost
impossible to fulfill the purpose of the clemency provision described
by Alexander Hamilton.
In addition, it might be argued that, in keeping with the fun-
damental provisions of our system of criminal justice, the pre-
sumption of innocence follows the accused not only through the
judicial system, but also continues in the matter of clemency.
Should the governor in considering an application for clemency be
forced to divorce himself from the doubt of guilt?
As in the case of Edyth Klumpp, subsequent developments
indicated that the jury which had found her guilty of first degree
murder with the recommendation of mercy had been taken out to
view a site at which the killing had not occurred; that the defendant
at least had claimed she had not told the truth in the course of the
trial; and that one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution
had at least lied, if he had not committed perjury. Should the
governor push all of this aside and say that the jury had received
all of the facts? Is it possible that in our system of justice, where
clemency is an essential part, that one who is charged with making
a decision between life and death should conduct a routine review
and affirm a sentence of death lightly, callously, and without
compunction?
There is a great need for the understanding of the function
and purpose of clemency. There is a greater need that it be admin-
istered as envisioned by those who established our system of law
and justice as a basis for a democratic society.
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